Official Records of the Rebellion

Official Records of the Rebellion: Volume Eleven, Chapter 23, Part 1: Peninsular Campaign: Reports

The Document

No.2. Reports of Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer of operations from May 23, 1861, to August 15, 1862.

[p.126: COMPLAINS ABOUT RANK]

I have enumerated twelve officers of the Engineer Corps (including Lieutenant Abbot, Topographical Engineers). Of these one possessed the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers, another of lieutenant- colonel, aide-de-camp (the first is a major, the second a captain in the corps), and two were captains, seven others first lieutenants, and one a second lieutenant. The brigadier-general was so made expressly to enable him to command the brigade of volunteer regiments. The battalion of Regular Engineers was commanded by a captain, and each of its three companies by a single first lieutenant.

It will be thus seen that the Corps of Engineers as now organized does not furnish adequate rank even to command the limited number of engineer troops brought into the field. The engineers attached to the army corps (with the single exception of Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, who derived his rank not from the corps, but from a law having no particular relation to engineers, and since repealed) were but lieutenants. In a European service the chief engineer serving with an army corps would be a field officer, generally a colonel.

There is a twofold evil in this want of rank: First, the great hardships and injustice to the officers themselves, for they have, almost without exception, refused or been refused high positions in the volunteer service (to which they have seen their contemporaries of the other branches elevated) on the ground that their services as engineers were absolutely necessary. Second, it is an evil to the service, since an adequate rank is almost as necessary to an officer for the efficient discharge of his duties as professional knowledge. The engineer’s duty is a responsible one. He is called upon to decide important questions, to fix the positions of defensive works (and thereby of the troops who occupy them,) to indicate the manner and points of attack of fortified positions. To give him the proper weight with those with whom he is associated he should have, as they have, adequate rank.

The campaign on the Peninsula called for great labor on the part of the engineers. The country, notwithstanding its early settlement was a terra incognita. We knew the York River and the James River, and we had heard of the Chickahominy, and this was about the extent of our knowledge. Our maps were so incorrect, that they were found to be worthless before we reached Yorktown. New ones had to be prepared, based on reconnaissances made by the officers of engineers. The siege of Yorktown involved great responsibility, besides exposure and toil. The movements of the whole army were determined by the engineers. The Chickahominy again arrested us, where, if possible, the responsibility and labor of the engineer officers were increased. In fact, everywhere and on every occasion, even to our last position at Harrison’s Landing, this responsibility and labor on the part of the engineers was incessant.

[p.127]

I have stated above in what manner the officers of engineers performed their duties; yet thus far their services are ignored and unrecognized, while distinctions have been bestowed upon those who have had the good fortune to command troops. Under such circumstances it can hardly be expected that the few engineer officers yet remaining will willingly continue their services in this unrequited branch of the military profession. We have not sufficient officers of engineers at this time with any of our armies to commence another siege, nor can they be obtained. In another war, if their services are thus neglected in this, we will have none.

Another evil of no inconsiderable magnitude was experienced in this campaign, growing out of the want of a properly-organized engineer service in this country. In a European service every corps d’armée (or division, if this were the highest unit of command) would have its proper proportion of engineer troops, and to their charge would be committed the engineer train, carrying the intrenching tools for the use of the troops. For example, a corps of 30,000 or 40,000 men would have in the French service a train of 41 wagons, of which 30 would carry 10,000 intrenching tools. This train would be under the immediate charge of a company of sappers, whose business it would be to issue them to the troops where wanted, to be with the working parties, directing the same, and to receive the tools back again when the work was completed.

For want of such an organization the issue of intrenching tools to the army was necessarily left to the Quartermaster’s Department. This department, burdened with its immense duties, could not give especial attention to this, in consequence of which important works were frequently delayed, as at Yorktown, where details assembled to make roads were sent back for want of tools, though they were in ample quantities on board the transports. Furthermore, it was impossible to maintain any system of responsibility for the tools. The soldier found an ax or a shovel a very convenient thing to have at his camp, and carried one off with him. When the army moved he found it inconvenient to carry and threw it away. Thus, notwithstanding the number of tools issued to the army at Yorktown and on the Chickahominy, we were almost wholly dependent in making the works at Harrison’s Landing upon new supplies from the transports sent to the James River.

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How to cite this article

Official Records of the Rebellion: Volume Eleven, Chapter 23, Part 1: Peninsular Campaign: Reports, pp.126-127

web page Rickard, J (20 June 2006), http://www.historyofwar.org/sources/acw/officialrecords/vol011chap023part1/00002_22.html


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